This paper proposes a new model that explains the violations of expected utility theory through the role of random errors. The paper analyzes decision making under risk when individuals make random errors when they compute expected utilities. Errors are drawn from the normal distribution, which is truncated so that the stochastic utility of a lottery cannot be greater (lower) than the utility of the highest (lowest) possible outcome. The standard deviation of random errors is higher for lotteries with a wider range of possible outcomes. It converges to zero for lotteries converging to a degenerate lottery. The model explains all major stylized empirical facts such as the Allais paradox and the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. The model fits the data from ten well-known experimental studies at least as good as cumulative prospect theory.
Introduction
Expected utility theory or EUT (e.g. von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) is a compelling normative decision theory in choice under risk (e.g. Knight, 1921) . However, persistent violations of EUT, such as the Allais paradox (e.g. Allais, 1953) , make EUT a descriptively inadequate theory (e.g. Camerer, 1995) . Many theories have been proposed to improve the descriptive fit of EUT by introducing a few extra parameters and relaxing some of EUT axioms (e.g. Starmer, 2000) . Though no clear successor of EUT emerged (e.g. Harless and Camerer, 1994 ; Hey and Orme, 1994) , the decision theory that explains the largest fraction of the empirical evidence appears to be cumulative prospect theory or CPT (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) . This paper takes a new approach to explain the violations of EUT through the role of random errors. Camerer (1989) , Starmer and Sugden (1989) and Wu (1994) provide extensive experimental evidence that there is some degree of randomness in the observed individual preference between lotteries. When individuals choose repeatedly between the same two lotteries and they can declare indifference, identical decisions are made only in around 75% of all cases (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994) . In other words, decision making under risk is inherently stochastic.
Moreover, Hey (2001) provides experimental evidence that the variability of the subjects' responses is generally higher than the difference in predictive error of various decision theories.
Several models (e.g. Harless and Camerer, 1994; Hey and Orme, 1994) exist already that describe the decisions of individuals who make random errors when computing the expected utility of a lottery. This paper proposes a new and more elaborate structure of an error term: the distribution of random errors is truncated and its standard deviation is lottery-specific. The reexamination of experimental evidence reveals that the predictive power of the new model is at least as good as that of CPT. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A stochastic expected utility theory or StEUT is described in section 2. Section 3 demonstrates that StEUT explains all major stylized empirical facts such as the Allais paradox and the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) . Section 4 compares the explanatory power of StEUT and CPT using the data from ten well-known experimental studies. Section 5 concludes.
Theory
Let ( ) The utility function R R : → u is defined over changes in wealth rather than absolute wealth levels, as proposed by Markowitz (1952) . By assumption, the error term L ξ is independently and normally distributed with a zero mean. If L ξ represents the average of various mistakes committed by an individual when computing expected utility, the distribution of L ξ is asymptotically normal due to the Central Limit Theorem. The specification of an error term (1) also appears in Hey and Orme (1994, p.1301) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999) .
The stochastic expected utility of a lottery cannot be less than the utility of the lowest possible outcome (see, however, Gneezy et al., 2004) . Similarly, it cannot exceed the utility of the highest possible outcome. Therefore, the normal distribution of an error term is truncated so The standard deviation of random errors L σ is lottery-specific (e.g. Hey, 1995) and it has two properties. First, ceteris paribus, the standard deviation of random errors is higher for lotteries with a wider range of possible outcomes. Second, the standard deviation of random errors converges to zero for lotteries converging to a degenerate lottery, i.e. (1)- (2) complete the description of StEUT. Obviously, when the standard deviation of random errors is zero for all lotteries, StEUT coincides with the deterministic EUT.
Explanation of the stylized facts
Having described the building blocks of StEUT, this section explores how this new model explains theoretically the major stylized empirical facts. Subsection 3.1 below provides intuition behind the StEUT explanation of the most famous example of EUT violations-the Allais paradox. More technical subsections 3.2, 3.3, 3.5 and 3.5 show that StEUT explains the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, the generalized common consequence effect (of which the Allais paradox is one specific example), the common ratio effect and the violation of betweenness.
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The Allais paradox
The Allais paradox refers to the choice pattern ( ) ( ) 
, which is frequently found in the empirical studies (e.g. Slovic and Tversky, 1974 ). Deterministic EUT cannot explain this choice pattern (e.g. Allais, 1953) . Figure 1 demonstrates how StEUT explains the Allais paradox. The horizontal axis is the subjective utility scale ranging from ( ) 0 u to ( ) 6 10 5 ⋅ u . The utility of lottery 1 L is deterministic and equals to ( ) 6 10 u . It is assumed that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) The distributions of ( ) 
The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes
The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes refers to an empirical observation that individuals often exhibit risk aversion when dealing with probable gains or improbable losses. The same individuals often exhibit risk seeking when dealing with improbable gains or probable losses (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) . One of the implications of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes is that individuals can simultaneously purchase insurance and public lottery tickets. The latter paradoxical observation was the first descriptive challenge for the deterministic EUT (e.g.
Friedman and Savage, 1948).
To demonstrate how StEUT explains the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, it is necessary first to calculate the certainty equivalent of an arbitrary lottery L according to StEUT. By definition, the certainty equivalent of a lottery is an outcome whose utility is equal to the utility of the lottery. Unlike the deterministic decision theories, StEUT postulates that the utility of the lottery, as given by equation (1), is a random variable. In this case it is natural to define the certainty equivalent of lottery L as an outcome CE whose utility is equal to the mathematical expectation of the utility of lottery
Using equation (1) this definition can be rewritten as equation (3).
Inserting equation (2) into (3) and simplifying the algebra, we obtain equation (4) .
denote the certainty equivalent of lottery L according to the deterministic EUT. Equation (4) then implies that
. 1 In other words, random errors overvalue the certainty equivalent (4) of a lottery whose expected utility L µ is close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome ( ) If the utility function ( )
words, an individual with a concave utility function is always risk averse according to EUT. 1 This result follows directly from equation (4) . The difference
is always positive and the difference According to StEUT, an individual with a concave utility function is always risk averse when the expected utility of a lottery is close to the utility of the highest possible outcome. In this case,
. When the expected utility of a lottery is close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome, i.e. Similarly, an individual with a convex utility function is always risk seeking according to EUT. According to StEUT, an individual with a convex utility function is always risk seeking when the expected utility of a lottery is close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome. He or she may be risk averse when the expected utility of a lottery is close to the utility of the highest possible outcome. Risk aversion occurs when random errors undervalue the certainty equivalent of a lottery below its expected value though in the absence of any error the certainty equivalent of a lottery is greater than its expected value.
To summarize, both for concave and convex subjective utility functions StEUT admits the incidence of risk seeking (risk aversion) for lotteries whose expected utility is close to the utility of the lowest (highest) possible outcome. In the terminology of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) a lottery whose expected utility is close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome is called either an improbable gain or a probable loss. Similarly, a lottery whose expected utility is close to the utility of the highest possible outcome is called either a probable gain or an improbable loss. Therefore, StEUT is able to explain the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. 
3.3.
Generalized common consequence effect with probabilities p and q − 1 close to zero such that when probability r decreases from t − 1 to zero the fraction of individuals who prefer S over R first increases and then decreases (e.g. Wu and Gonzalez, 1998) . Intuitively, when the probability mass is shifted from the medium outcome to the lowest possible outcome, the choice of a riskier lottery becomes first more likely and then-less likely. This pattern is reversed when the probability mass is shifted from the medium outcome to the highest outcome.
To demonstrate how StEUT explains the common consequence effect, it is necessary first to calculate the probability of choosing lottery S over R in a binary choice. According to equation
When we substitute for the probability density function from (2), this can be written as (5) .
where L Φ is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution with zero mean and a
The lotteries involved in the generalized common consequence effect are constructed in such a way that the range of possible outcomes of one lottery ( S and S′ ) is always within the range of possible outcomes of the other lottery ( R and R′ ). Therefore, when
we can infer that
. Plugging these results into equation (5) and simplifying algebra yields equation (6) .
Consider now how the shift of the probability mass from the medium to the lowest possible outcome affects ( )
given by equation (6) . In the simplest case when S and R have the same expected utility ( R S µ µ = ) and the same standard deviation of random errors
Therefore, an individual prefers R to S when R S µ µ = and R S σ σ = . Notice that lottery R has a wider range of possible outcomes than lottery S. According to the assumption of StEUT, this implies that ceteris paribus R S σ σ < . However, when the probability mass is shifted to the lowest possible outcome, R converges to a degenerate lottery (given that a fixed probability q attached to the highest outcome is small). According to another assumption of StEUT, R σ then converges to zero. Therefore, we may observe that R S σ σ = only when the probability mass is shifted to the lowest possible outcome. All together this implies that StEUT predicts preference S R f when R and S have the same expected utility and the probability mass is shifted to the lowest outcome (so that R S σ σ = ).
When R and S have the same expected utility ( R S µ µ = ) and the probability mass is shifted to the medium outcome, it must be the case that R S σ σ < because R has a wider range of possible outcomes and, moreover, S converges to a degenerate lottery, i.e. S σ converges to zero.
When the probability mass is shifted to the medium outcome, the expected utility of S converges to the utility of the medium outcome, which is also the highest possible outcome of lottery S, i.e. , such that equation (7) holds.
( ) ( ) ( )
Plugging result (7) into equation (6) and simplifying the algebra yields
i.e. an individual prefers S to R if and only if inequality (8) holds.
( )
)
the right hand side of (8) is always less than unity.
However, when S σ converges to zero the left hand side of (8) for certain (
and S is preferred to R if and only if
Notice that when the probability mass is shifted to the lowest possible outcome so that lottery R converges to a degenerate lottery (probability q is small), S σ converges to zero. In this case it is possible that S R σ σ < . Additionally, when the probability mass is shifted to the lowest possible outcome the expected utility of S converges to the utility of the lowest outcome, i.e. ( ) ( )
when S R σ σ = , and an individual may prefer S to R. To summarize, when lotteries S and R have the same expected utility and the probability mass is shifted from the medium to the lowest outcome, StEUT predicts that
first decreases, but then it may increase.
Intuitively, when the probability mass is allocated to the medium outcome, which is close to the highest possible outcome in terms of individual's utility, an individual prefers S to R.
Utility of S is deterministic (not affected by random errors). However, random errors are likely to undervalue the utility of R. When the probability mass is allocated to the lowest possible outcome, random errors are likely to overvalue the utility of both S and R. This effect is stronger for R, i.e. an individual prefers R to S, because R has a wider range of possible outcomes (and hence a higher volatility of errors). However, when the probability mass is shifted to the lowest outcome so dramatically that R delivers the lowest outcome almost for certain, an individual may prefer S to R. The variance of errors that distort the utility of R converges to zero, i.e. random errors almost do not overvalue the utility of R, but they do overvalue the utility of S.
Notice that according to StEUT, the incidence of the common consequence effect decreases if lottery S has the same range of possible outcomes as lottery R. Camerer (1992) finds experimental evidence confirming this prediction: when S and R are located inside the probability triangle the common consequence effect largely disappears (section 4.6 below).
Consider now the situation when the probability mass is shifted from the medium outcome to the highest outcome. Lotteries S ′ and R′ have the same range of possible outcomes,
i.e. ceteris paribus R S σ σ = . When the probability mass is allocated to the medium outcome
), lottery S ′ converges to a degenerate lottery, i.e. 0 → S σ , and hence
When the probability mass is allocated to the highest outcome ( 0 = r ), lottery R′ converges to a degenerate lottery and hence
In the simplest case when
, i.e. an individual prefers R over S. Thus, when the probability mass is shifted to the medium outcome, StEUT predicts that
When the probability mass is shifted to the highest outcome, i.e.
( )
individual prefers R over S. To summarize, when lotteries S and R have the same expected utility and the probability mass is shifted from the medium to the highest outcome, StEUT predicts that
may first increase but then it decreases. Thus, theoretically, StEUT is able to explain the generalized common consequence effect. Subsection 4.3 below discusses how StEUT accommodates the actual experimental evidence of the generalized common consequence effect reported in Wu and Gonzalez (1996) .
Common ratio effect
The common ratio effect is an empirical observation that there exist pairs of lotteries to R when r is close to unity and the same individual prefers R to S when r is close to zero (e.g.
Starmer, 2000)
. According to StEUT, the probability that an individual chooses S over R is given by equation (6) . For simplicity, utility function can be normalized so that ( ) 0
. Equation (6) then becomes equation (9) for a pair of lotteries involved in the common ratio effect.
Assume that R S σ σ = when r converges to zero. This assumption is justifiable because although R has a wider range of possible outcomes, i.e. ceteris paribus R S σ σ < , R also converges to a degenerate lottery faster than S does. It follows then from equation (10) 
. Note that this result does not depend on any assumptions about ( )
when r is close to unity. In other words, according to StEUT an individual prefers R over S when r is close to zero (so that R S σ σ = ), and the same individual may prefer S to R when r is close to unity. Subsections 4.5 and 4.9 below discuss how StEUT fits the actual experimental evidence of the common ratio effect reported correspondingly in Bernasconi (1994) and Loomes and Sugden (1998).
Violation of betweenness
The betweenness axiom states that if an individual is indifferent between two lotteries than a probability mixture of these two lotteries is equally good (e.g., Dekel, 1986 and R and a probability mixture 
indicate that an individual likes randomization, i.e. they reveal quasi-concave preferences.
Choice patterns
indicate that an individual dislikes randomization, i.e. they reveal quasi-convex preferences. An asymmetric split between quasi-concave and quasi-convex preferences is taken as an evidence of betweenness violation.
The betweenness axiom is a weaker version of the independence axiom of the deterministic EUT (e.g., Dekel, 1986 ). Thus, deterministic EUT cannot explain the violation of betweenness. StEUT is able to explain such violation as it is demonstrated by one specific example below. Consider lotteries S and R such that S and R have the same lowest possible outcome, but the highest possible outcome of S is lower than the highest possible outcome of R.
According to the assumption of StEUT, this implies that R S σ σ < because R has a wider range of possible outcomes. Let the expected utility of S be closer to the utility of the lowest outcome than to the utility of the highest outcome. Finally, assume for the sake of argument that
, i.e. an individual prefers S to R. Empirical tests of betweenness employing lotteries S and R that satisfy the above assumptions were conducted inter alia by Prelec (1990) , Camerer and Ho (1994) and Bernasconi (1994) . 
is determined by equation (6) . Taking into consideration that S µ is as close as necessary to ( ) S x u 1 by assumption and following the same argument as described in section 3.3 above, it is possible to prove that
In other words, an individual may prefer M to S although at the same time S is preferred to R, which is a violation of betweenness (e.g. Prelec, 1990 ).
Intuitively, S and M have almost identical expected utilities, which are close to the utility of their lowest possible outcome. In this case, random errors are likely to overvalue the stochastic utility of both S and M, but this effect is stronger for M because the stochastic utility of M has a higher volatility of random errors. Thus, an individual may prefer M to S and S to R. In other words, StEUT predicts a higher incidence of the quasi-concave preferences. Subsections 4.4 and 4.5 below discuss how StEUT fits the actual experimental evidence of betweenness violation reported correspondingly in Camerer and Ho (1994) and Bernasconi (1994) .
Fit to experimental data
The previous section demonstrated that StEUT is able to explain theoretically all major well-known empirical facts. This section explores how StEUT fits the actual empirical data. In the following subsections 4.1.-4.9 the same parsimonious parametric form of StEUT is used to accommodate the aggregate choice pattern revealed in nine well-known experimental studies. Of course, individuals do not share identical preferences. However, a single-agent stochastic model is a simple method for integrating data from many studies, where individual estimates have low power, e.g. when one subject makes only a few decisions (e.g. Camerer and Ho, 1994, p.186).
Such approach is also relevant in an economic sense because it describes the behavior of a "representative agent" (e.g. Wu and Gonzalez, 1996) . In the subsection 4.10, the parametric form of StEUT is estimated separately for every subject using the experimental data from Hey and Orme (1994).
4.1.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) Tversky and Kahneman (1992) The fourth column of tables 1 and 2 presents the certainty equivalents predicted by
StEUT in equation (4) . For estimation purposes, a subjective utility function is defined over changes in wealth exactly as the value function is defined in CPT, e.g. equation (10) .
( ) According to StEUT, the standard deviation of random errors is higher for lotteries with a wider range of possible outcomes, and it converges to zero for lotteries converging to a degenerate lottery. Although many functional forms satisfy these two properties, a parsimonious specification (11) turned out to fit the data most successfully. outcomes. For comparison, when the certainty equivalents are calculated through the deterministic EUT, WSSE is 3.788 for lotteries that have only positive outcomes, and WSSE is 3.1958 for lotteries that have only negative outcomes. 2 To summarize, StEUT explains successfully the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes documented in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and its prediction is at least as good as that of CPT and it is significantly better than that of EUT. 2 The prediction of the deterministic EUT is calculated using the same utility function as in StEUT, i.e. 
4.2.
Gonzalez and Wu (1999) Gonzalez and Wu (1999) Overall StEUT fits the data from Gonzalez and Wu (1999) Table 3 Gonzalez and Wu (1999) dataset: median certainty equivalents of lotteries as elicited in the experiment (first number), certainty equivalents predicted by CPT (second number) and certainty equivalents predicted by StEUT (third number) In every block, all 8 problems are constructed by shifting the same probability mass from the medium to the lowest outcome to test for the generalized common consequence effect. The third column of table 4 presents the fraction of subjects F who choose a safer lottery S in the corresponding problem. The data from Wu and Gonzalez (1996) document a strong common consequence effect. In all five blocks, the fraction F first decreases and then increases when the probability mass is shifted from the medium outcome to the lowest outcome.
Wu and Gonzalez (1996)
The fourth column of table 4 presents the probability of choosing S over R as predicted by CPT. Wu and Gonzalez (1996) calculate this probability using the logistic function proposed 
Minimization of SSE is equivalent to maximum likelihood if errors are distributed normally, e.g.
Seber and Wild (1989). The fifth column of table 4 presents the probability of choosing S over R
as predicted by StEUT. This probability is calculated through equation (6) 
4.4.
Camerer and Ho (1994) Camerer and Ho (1994) StEUT fits to the data in Bernasconi (1994) better (SSE=1.1452) than does CPT (SSE=1.3609). Notice that problems #1 and #6 as well as #11 and #16 constitute together two pairs of common ratio problems. StEUT predicts correctly the common ratio effect: the fraction of subjects choosing S over R is much lower in problems #6 and #16 than in problems #1 and #11 (the prediction of CPT is less accurate). However, StEUT fails to explain the choice pattern observed in problems #7, #12, #15 and #17 (the prediction of CPT is only slightly more accurate). These are the problems in which Bernasconi (1994) finds a strong asymmetric split between quasi-concave and quasi-convex preferences, i.e. an evidence of betweenness violation, when the modal choice is not consistent with the betweenness axiom. We already observed a similar predictive failure of both StEUT and CPT in problem #11 from table 5.
Bernasconi (1994)

4.6.
Camerer (1992) Camerer (1992) does not find any significant evidence of the common consequence and common ratio effects. Thus, deterministic EUT explains the data in Camerer (1992) quite well.
In tables 7 and 8 the best fitting parametric form of CPT has a coefficient γ close to unity, which signifies a minimum departure from linear probability weighting. Similarly, in tables 7
and 8 the best fitting parametric form of StEUT has a coefficient σ close to zero, which denotes a minimum departure from the deterministic EUT. Departures from the deterministic EUT are more apparent only in choices involving lotteries with negative outcomes, e.g. 
4.7.
Camerer (1989) Conlisk (1989) . Table 13 has the same   format as table 5 . Conlisk (1989) replicates the Allais paradox in problems #1 and #2. Problems #3 and #4 constitute a similar common consequence problem to the Allais paradox; however, they do not employ a degenerate lottery that delivers one million for certain. Table 13 shows that the incidence of the Allais paradox completely disappears in problems #3 and #4. Finally, problems #1 and #5 constitute a variant of the Allais paradox, when a probability mass is shifted from the medium to the highest (not lowest) outcome. Table 13 shows that the switch in preferences between lotteries S and R across problems #1 and #5 is comparable to that in problems #1 and #2 (the original Allais paradox).
Conlisk (1989)
StEUT with the estimated best fitting parameters . . CPT predicts very well the original Allais paradox; however, it also predicts the common consequence effect for problems #3 and #4, which is not found in the data.
StEUT makes a less accurate prediction for the original Allais paradox but it predicts no common consequence effect for problems #3 and #4. 
4.9.
Loomes and Sugden (1998) In the experiment of Loomes and Sugden (1998) the subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two groups. Therefore, a representative agent may be expected to be the same for both 
Conclusion
A large amount of the empirical evidence on individual decision making under risk can be explained by a new model-stochastic expected utility theory (StEUT). According to StEUT, an individual chooses among lotteries to maximize their expected utility distorted by random errors. Four assumptions about the structure of an error term are the building blocks of StEUT:
1. An error term is additive on the utility scale with utility being defined over changes in wealth rather than absolute wealth levels.
2. An error is drawn from the normal distribution with zero mean which is truncated so that the internality axiom holds, i.e. the stochastic utility of a lottery cannot be lower than the utility of the lowest possible outcome and it cannot be higher than the utility of the highest possible outcome.
3. The standard deviation of an error is higher for lotteries with a wider range of possible outcomes.
4. the standard deviation of an error converges to zero for lotteries converging to a degenerate lottery, i.e. there is no error in a choice between "sure things".
Four assumptions of StEUT are appealing intuitively, and they are sufficient to explain all major empirical facts such as the Allais paradox and the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. The most important assumption is probably the truncation of the distribution of an error term. It implies that the lotteries whose expected utility is close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome are systematically overvalued and the lotteries whose expected utility is close to the utility of the highest possible outcome are systematically undervalued.
StEUT appears to be a very descriptive model. The reexamination of experimental data from ten well-known studies reveals that StEUT explains the observed choice patterns at least as good as does CPT. This result suggests that a descriptive decision theory can be constructed by modeling the structure of an error term rather than by developing the deterministic non-expected utility theories. This problem is even more severe for CPT embedded in the logistic stochastic utility. Loomes and Sugden (1998) notice that, in general, a stochastic utility model with an error term additive on the utility scale predicts too many violations of dominance. Thus, a natural extension of the present model is to incorporate a mechanism that reduces error in case of stochastic dominance.
To summarize, there is a potential for constructing even a better descriptive model than StEUT (and CPT) that explains the above mentioned choice patterns. The contribution of the present paper is the demonstration that this hunt for a descriptive decision theory can be more successful with modeling the effect of random errors. The latter approach also makes clear prediction about the consistency rates (test-retest reliability) when the same decision problem is presented to the same individual on two different occasions. This is a promising avenue for future research, which received little attention so far (see, however, Hey, 2001 ).
